The European Union, international law and the Middle East peace process by Khaliq, Urfan
20
Amicus Curiae   Issue 78   Summer 2009
The ongoing malaise in Israeli-Palestinian affairsperiodically leads to calls for action from theEuropean Union to take a more active role and for
it to assist in the search for a sustainable and just solution
to that dispute.  In its 2003 Security Strategy the EU noted
that “resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic
priority for Europe.”  Twenty-seven economically
developed and powerful states who have agreed to have a
common foreign policy which seeks to, inter alia, uphold
respect for international law, human rights, democracy and
the rule of law have an obvious interest in settling a dispute
in their proclaimed neighbourhood.  
The EU and its Member States have long taken a
position on the Middle East peace process (MEPP).  The
(then) nine Member States in the Venice Declaration of
1980 first set out their position and this, officially at least,
still forms the basis of the EU’s approach. The Venice
Declaration supports Palestinian self-rule, considers Israeli
settlements in the Occupied Territories to be illegal and
has been the basis for the EU repeatedly demanding that
Israel comply with Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338.  In both seeking to give effect to the Venice
Declaration and in response to its increasing importance as
a regional actor on the global scene, the EU has become
involved in the search for peace in the Middle East in a
number of different ways.  The first is as a member of the
Quartet, an ad hoc arrangement alongside the US, UN and
Russia. The EU has three representatives in the Quartet –
the External Relations Commissioner, the High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and a representative from the Member State
which holds the Presidency at the time.  The representative
of the Presidency, of course, reflects in the Quartet the
perspective of that particular Member State and thus the
approach is usually subtly, sometimes markedly, different
every six months.  
The EU is also directly involved in the MEPP outside of
the Quartet. The Presidency, Troika, President of the
Commission, Commissioner for External Relations,
Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid,
High Representative for the CFSP and the Special
Representative for the Middle East peace process all make
separate and at times differing contributions to it.  There
are also the Member States some of whom, in particular
the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, ensure
that their voices are also heard separately. 
THE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS
The most important basis for relations between the EU
and its Member States, on the one hand, and, on the other,
the Palestinians or the Israelis are the Association
Agreements which have been negotiated with them.  These
Agreements cover trade and other forms of cooperation
and as a consequence of their coming into force relations
with both Israel and the Palestinians have been enhanced.
The 8th EU-Israel Association Council meeting of June
2008 decided to upgrade the existing relationship,
although further to the Israeli incursion into Gaza at the
end of 2008 this seems to be on hold.  Technically this
Agreement is “mixed”, it is between the Community and
its Member States on the one hand and Israel on the other.
The other Agreement is between the Community only and
the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) on behalf of
the Palestinian Authority.  This Agreement continues to
legally function notwithstanding the disintegration of the
Palestinian Authority into Hamas and Fatah-controlled
factions in Gaza and the West Bank respectively.  The
Agreement with the Fatah-dominated PLO continues to
apply to the Hamas-run Gaza Strip, for example, with
regard to that minimal quantity of goods which are
exported from that territory to the EU’s Member States.
Having first designated Hamas a “terrorist organisation” in
2001, the EU has no official contact with it. 
Both the Agreements have in article 2 an “essential
elements” clause which requires that, “relations between
the parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement
itself, shall be based on respect for human rights and
democratic principles, which guides their internal and
international policy and constitutes an essential element of
this Agreement.”  It is these clauses of the Agreements
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which are invoked when calls are made for the EU to
suspend relations with either Israel or the Palestinians
further to a particular development, or more often one
outrage or another.  What such calls seem to overlook is
the fact that the Agreements also contain a clause (arts 76
and 78 of the Agreements with Israel and the Palestinians
respectively) which state that nothing in the Agreement
shall prevent a party from taking any measures: 
which it considers essential to its own security in the event of
serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law
and order, in time of war or serious international tension
constituting threat of war or in order to carry out obligations
it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and
international security.
In many senses the “essential elements” clause on the
one hand and the “security considerations” clause on the
other encapsulate the balance that must be struck by the
Community (and in the case of Israel the Member States
also) as far as both Agreements are concerned; respect for
human rights and democratic principles are an essential
element of the Agreement but any measures taken for
essential security purposes are permissible.  Blatant
violations of international law by either or both sides in the
context of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli dispute, however,
cannot go unchallenged by the EU; if the essential elements
clause is to have any credibility in relations with other
states (the clause is standard in all “third-generation”
community Agreements) then it must be invoked where
the rules and principles it seeks to protect are flagrantly
violated.  The essential elements clause must also be seen
in the context of the EU’s more general foreign policy
orientation of which it is a part.  The EU has for a number
of years now claimed to have a normative dimension to its
foreign policy.  This has been made clear in numerous
declarations and in existing treaty provisions.  The Lisbon
Treaty, which is not yet in force, encapsulates the existing
approach when in relations with the wider world it obliges
the EU to “contribute to peace, security, ... the eradication
of poverty and the protection of human rights, as well as to
the strict observance and the development of international
law, including respect for the principles of the United
Nations Charter.”
In the EU’s relations with both Israel and the
Palestinians there are numerous examples of incidents or
policies which are clear breaches of the principles and rules
referred to in the Lisbon Treaty and in the essential
elements clauses.  With regard to the Israel, there are its
numerous incursions into Gaza which have resulted in the
indiscriminate killings of non-combatants and the wanton
destruction of civilian infrastructure.  For example, further
to the Israeli attack on Beit Hanoun in 2006, the Human
Rights Council established a fact-finding mission, with
which Israel refused to cooperate, that concluded “there is
evidence of a disproportionate and reckless disregard for
Palestinian civilian life, contrary to the requirements of
international humanitarian law and raising legitimate
concerns about the possibility of a war crime having been
committed.”  The UN Special Rapporteur at the time,
Professor John Dugard, considered there was evidence of
“serious war crimes” committed by Israel. 
In the West Bank there is the ever-expanding settlement
activity and the building of the “security wall” which,
where it deviates from the Green Line (the 1949 armistice
line which prior to 1967 was the boundary between Israel
and Jordan) and encroaches into the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, has been described by the International Court
of Justice in 2004 as severely impeding the Palestinians’
right to self-determination; violating a number of
international human rights and humanitarian law
obligations incumbent upon Israel; being tantamount to de
facto annexation; and taking a route not essential for
security purposes.  With regard to the Palestinians, there
are the rocket attacks upon southern Israel emanating from
Gaza and also other blatant violations of international
humanitarian law, such as the targeting of Israeli civilians
through suicide missions as well as the internecine conflict
between the supporters of Hamas and Fatah.  
ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUSPENDING THE
AGREEMENTS
Prima facie it would be legally justifiable for the
Community to suspend the Agreements with both Israel
and the Palestinians.  Article 60 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties 1969, which represents customary
international law, concerns material breach of treaty
obligations and clearly permits the Agreements to be
suspended or terminated due to, for example, the acts
mentioned above.  In the case of relations with both Israel
and the Palestinians, however, and in the more general
context of the Middle East peace process things are not so
straightforward.  In the case of relations with Israel, the
EU has not suspended the Agreement for a number of
reasons.
First, Commission officials consider Israeli delegations
in all fora to have a very business-like and professional
approach to the issues of, inter alia, human rights and
international law.  Israeli diplomats, well aware of the
different perspectives of the Member States, strategically
make limited concessions to ensure that any consensus
which may exist to take action by the Member States
quickly breaks down.  Second, even in the event that a
decision can be reached between the Member States that
the Agreement should be suspended, the EU is well aware
that if this were done Israel would be likely to refuse to
agree to its further participation in any negotiations
concerning the MEPP or at least try and relegate it to an
ancillary role.  With the coming to power of Benjamin
Netanyahu in a Likud-led coalition in March 2009, this has
again become a very real possibility.  It was reported at the
end of April 2009 that the Israeli Deputy Director for
European Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rafi
Brak, summoned EU envoys and warned them that the EU 21
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would be excluded from all future Middle East peace
negotiations unless it stopped publically criticising Israel
and if plans to upgrade EU-Israel relations, as agreed in
June 2008, were thrown off-track.  The general idea, in
practice, seems to be that the peace process and the EU’s
role in it must take priority and the possibility of
maintaining some influence over Israel comes first.  
Third, the dependence of the Palestinian Territories
upon Israel for their economic survival and physical well-
being means that the Member States consider that
suspension of the Agreement with Israel is likely to have an
adverse effect on the Palestinians.  Negotiation and
dialogue with Israel have thus been maintained at all costs.
Finally, it is politically increasingly difficult for the EU’s
Member States to suspend the Agreement.  The refusal to
suspend it, following events that have already occurred,
may mean that in future the violations will have to be even
more serious before all the Member States agree to
suspend it.  In legal terms the position has probably not
changed although Israel may be able argue that estoppel is
now a relevant consideration.  
With regard to the Palestinians, although the approach
of the EU is somewhat different the outcome as far as the
Agreement is concerned is much the same.  At no point has
the EU seriously considered suspending the interim
Association Agreement, even though it ceased to provide
direct assistance to the Hamas-led government of the
Palestinian Authority and does not now provide direct aid
to the Hamas-led administration in Gaza.  For the EU,
relations with the Palestinian Authority are about creating
conditions and institutions in the Palestinian Territories
which can contribute to a viable two-state solution.  There
has been a constant and long-standing emphasis on
reforming the institutions of the Palestinian Authority.  The
EU’s fundamental problem in helping in the reform of
these institutions is that events on the ground move so
quickly in those territories and in Israel itself.  As a
consequence, the EU’s efforts since, in particular, 2000
have largely been engaged in damage limitation by trying to
prevent the humanitarian and political situation
deteriorating further as opposed to improving it per se.
The EU has been reactive not proactive, even though on a
number of occasions a proactive approach could have led
to an improvement on the ground. 
In taking action the EU has, of course, had to do so in
the context of the overall political climate.  The EU has, for
example, continually stressed the virtues of democracy,
human rights and the rule of law in its relations with the
Palestinian Authority and did not ostracise Arafat during
the last years of his life, despite tremendous pressure from
the United States and Israel to do so, because he was the
democratically elected Palestinian leader.  Yet, in the
context of an ongoing “war on terror” a Hamas election
victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council Elections in
January 2006 presented new dilemmas for the EU. The
EU’s behaviour both prior and subsequent to the election
is itself highly questionable from the perspective of
international law, the discussion below will focus on the
latter only.  
STRIKING A BALANCE WITH HAMAS
The balance which the EU had to strike once Hamas
won the 2006 PLC elections and formed a government was
an extremely difficult one.  The preferred option for the
EU, which was unrealistic, was for Hamas to be
pressurised to accept the conditions stipulated by the EU
and, inter alia, renounce violence and formally recognise
Israel.  The EU however had to consider the implications
of its attempt to isolate Hamas with its established policies
and practices and any other consequences that may follow.
First, in line with its long term policy in the Palestinian
Territories, the EU ideally needed to try and maintain the
Palestinian Authority’s institutional fabric. If lawlessness
and attacks on Israel were to be stemmed to any extent,
then the institutions and security services which already
existed had to be supported or at least not further
undermined, even if some of them were now under the
control of Hamas.  
Second, the EU needed to continue its humanitarian aid
supplies to the Palestinians not only due to the scale of the
humanitarian emergency but also if the EU was to try (in
which it failed) to avoid being perceived as punishing the
Palestinians for exercising their democratic rights as they
had been told to do.  Third, the EU needed to consider if
the suspension of direct aid to the Hamas-led government
could lead to other negative consequences in the overall
context of the Middle East.  The Palestinian budgetary
crisis exacerbated by Israel unlawfully halting all tax
transfers meant that to stop the Palestinian Authority from
collapsing the Hamas-led government had to turn to other
donors.  Some potential donors such as Iran and Syria are
involved in proxy wars against Israel.  The giving of aid by
these states could strengthen the position of those in
Hamas who take a harder line and make any peaceful
negotiation between the Palestinian factions and in
particular with Israel even less likely.  Fourth, a number of
the Member States felt that Hamas was undergoing (and
continues to do so) an evolutionary process into a political
body.  The then Finnish Foreign Minister during the
Finnish Presidency of the second half of 2006, for
example, was reportedly very keen on dealing with the
Hamas-led government.  It was argued during an informal
Foreign Ministers meeting that the peace process could
only be moved along by engaging with the Hamas-led
government as well as Fatah and the Israelis.  The UK and
Germany in particular were very concerned about the
consequences such a move would have on relations with
Israel and thus there was no change in approach towards
Hamas.  22
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THE TEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
MECHANISM
The EU’s solution to resolving its dilemma about
wishing not to further undermine some Palestinian
institutions, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and also
not dealing with Hamas was to create a temporary
international mechanism (TIM) – a funding mechanism
approved by the Quartet but funded primarily by the EU
which sought to bypass the democratically elected
government and some Palestinian institutions and to assist
needy individuals directly.  The EU needed a Palestinian
partner for the TIM to function, and that was to be
President Abbas.  The President’s office identified those
who were to benefit from the TIM.  The TIM unit then
validated and audited the funds to be transferred. In the
context of vicious inter-Palestinian factional fighting and a
power struggle, it is inconceivable that beneficiaries would
be identified by the President who were not at least
sympathetic to Fatah no matter how thorough the auditing
of their needs.  As well intentioned as the TIM may have
been with regard to alleviating Palestinian suffering, it was
designed to support an opposition politician, albeit one
with a democratically legitimate mandate, against a
democratically elected government with a view to
engineering the collapse of that democratically elected
government.  
States or the organisations they form must not intervene
in the internal affairs of another state.  Although the
Palestinian Territories are not a state, it is credible to argue
that due to their unique nature the same restriction applies
as far as its “domestic jurisdiction” is concerned as exists
in international law generally.  The International Court of
Justice made clear in the Nicaragua case that the principle
of non-intervention, “forbids all states or groups of states
to intervene directly or indirectly in the internal or
external affairs of other states. Intervention is wrongful
when it uses methods of coercion in regard to such
choices, which must remain free ones.  ... The choice of
political, economic, social and cultural system and the
formulation of foreign policy are all matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of a state.”  
The EU’s general strategy was to isolate Hamas and to
support President Abbas (and by extension the opposition
Fatah party) through, inter alia, the TIM and facilitate
Hamas’s failure.  The unequivocal welcoming by the EU
and Quartet of President Abbas’s dismissal of the Unity
Government in June 2007 in the context of a brutal
conflict between forces loyal to either Hamas or Fatah
again highlights the fact that the EU did and continues to
do all it can to support him against Hamas. If the EU’s
strategy after the 2006 elections is considered as a whole,
then it can be considered to satisfy the necessary threshold
to amount to intervention as defined in the Nicaragua case.
In many senses, the EU itself is acting in a way and also
tolerating legal violations by the protagonists which it
would not in any other circumstances.  The EU’s ultimate
policy objective in the region is to help find a solution to
and sustain any settlement in the dispute between Israel
and some of its Arab neighbours.  In the light of this
objective, keeping the peace process on track is
undisputedly the EU’s top priority but it seems to be with
little regard to the legal obligations of all involved. 
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